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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 4551

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR TEXT OF SECTIONS I - III

1. NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF HAS PREPARED A SINGLE TEXT CONTAINING SECTIONS I THRU III OF THE PAPER, "ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR."

2. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS:

INTRODUCTION

1. THE PRESENT DOCUMENT CONTAINS FIVE SECTIONS ENTITLED:

I. THE GUIDELINES

II. THE ALLIED POSITION

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

IV. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES

V. INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION

AND SETS OUT THE SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AS AGREED AMONG THE ALLIES.

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2. THE GUIDELINES PROVIDE THE STANDARD IN TERMS OF WHICH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL DETERMINE ANY NEGOTIATING POSITION; AND AGAINST WHICH ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL MEASURE ANY SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. SECTION II SETS OUT THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION. SECTION

III SUGGESTS THE WAYS IN WHICH THE ALLIES MIGHT PRESENT THEIR OWN VIEWS; EXPLORE THE THINKING OF THE OTHER SIDE; AND CONDUCT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SECTION IV SETS OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE ALLIES PREFER. SECTION V DEALS WITH OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONSULTATIVE PROGRAMME AMONG ALLIES IN BRUSSELS AND VIENNA.

I. THE GUIDELINES

PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES

3. THE ALLIED POSITION ON MBFR SHOULD AIM AT A BALANCED OUTCOME THAT WILL ENSURE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AT A LOWER LEVEL FOR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BY UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IS MEANT THE MAINTENANCE, AND IF POSSIBLE, THE ENHANCEMENT, OF THE MILITARY SECURITY POSTURE OF THE ALLIANCE.

4. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ONE OF THE ALLIED AIMS SHOULD BE TO SEEK TO REDUCE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND THUS TEST THE WARSAW PACT WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS CONCRETE MILITARY SECURITY ISSUES, WHICH COULD PROMOTE REAL DETENTE.

5. MBFR MEASURES SHOULD NOT BE OF SUCH SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE AS TO DIMINISH THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIES TO TAKE THE NECESSARY MILITARY STEPS TO FULFILL CURRENTLY AGREED NATO STRATEGY: FORWARD DEFENCE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

GEOGRAPHIC AND RELATED CONCERNS

6. REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CONFINED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO CENTRAL EUROPE.

PLUS EITHER: (THE GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATION OF OTHER MEASURES AGREED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF THESE MEASURES.)

OR: (OTHER MEASURES AGREED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD EQUALLY BE CONFINED GEOGRAPHICALLY TO CENTRAL EUROPE.)

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PLUS: THE SECURITY ISSUES ON THE FLANKS, IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND IN THE BALKANS ARE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO AVOID EITHER PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE APPROACHES TO MBFR WHICH WOULD OPEN UP THESE OTHER AREAS FOR CONSIDERATION IN (THE MBFR PROGRAMME) OR (REDUCTIONS) OR INVOLVE COMMITMENTS TO ADDRESS THESE AREAS AT A SUBSEQUENT STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. THE ALLIED POSITION ON MBFR SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE RISKS INVOLVED IN THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL GEOGRAPHICALLY CONFINED ARMS CONTROL ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MOREOVER, THE AREA FOR THE MBFR PROGRAMME MUST NOT BE LIMITED IN EAST AND WEST ONLY TO THE TERRITORIES OF THE TWO STATES IN GERMANY.

8. NEITHER THE CONDUCT NOR THE OUTCOME OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO INHIBIT THE AGREED PROGRAMME FOR THE CREATION OF A EUROPEAN UNION OR THE GROWTH OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE CO-OPERATION. EASTERN INFLUENCE, THROUGH MBFR AGREEMENTS AND PROCEDURES, ON WESTERN SECURITY STRUCTURE SHOULD BE AVOIDED, OR AT LEAST KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND ADMITTED ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

9. THE FORTHCOMING MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ALSO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE SECURITY OF NATO'S FLANKS OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

REDUCTIONS

10. IN PURSUIT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, THE ALLIED APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE AIMED AT REDUCING THE ASYMMETRIES IN THE MILITARY BALANCE FAVOURING THE WARSAW PACT (THE SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND OFFENSIVE ORIENTATION OF PACT FORCES) AND MITIGATING THE GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN RE-INFORCEMENT. THUS THE ALLIED OBJECTIVES IN MBFR SHOULD BE BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, (TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITY APPROPRIATELY DEFINED) AND THE REDUCTION OF ELEMENTS IN THE WARSAW PACT POSTURE MOST THREATENING TO NATO SECURITY.

11. EITHER(1): (GIVEN THE SUPERIORITY OF SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH IN THAT AREA MUST BE A PRIMARY AIM. IT CANNOT BE
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OBTAINED WITHOUT SOME REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN STATIONED FORCES. IN LIGHT OF THE CONSIDERATIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 2-6 ABOVE, REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CONFINED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES.)

(1) DELEGATIONS RECOGNIZED THIS TO BE ONE OF THE KEY ISSUES ON WHICH A FORMAL ALLIED DECISION CANNOT BE REACHED EASILY

OR: (IN AN OVERALL MBFR PROGRAMME, ALLIED OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO ACHIEVING A REDUCTION OF STATIONED FORCES, FOCUSED ON US AND SOVIET STATIONED FORCES. THE REPARTITION OF THESE STATIONED FORCE REDUCTIONS (I.E. IN THIS INSTANCE, FORCE REPATRIATIONS) ON THE NATO SIDE WILL BE A MATTER OF FURTHER ALLIED CONSULTATIONS.

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(SUBSEQUENTLY ATTENTION WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE QUESTION OF AN APPROPRIATE PACKAGE.)

REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES WILL BE LEFT TO A LATER STAGE.)
OR: (IN AN OVERALL MBFR PROGRAMME, ALLIED OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES. THE REPARTITION OF THESE REDUCTIONS ON THE NATO SIDE WILL BE A MATTER OF FURTHER ALLIED CONSULTATIONS.

SUBSEQUENTLY ATTENTION WILL BE ADDRESSED TO THE QUESTION OF AN APPROPRIATE MIXED PACKAGE.)

12. REDUCTIONS ON THE ALLIED SIDE SHOULD NOT EXCEED APPROXIMATELY TEN PER CENT IN TOTAL STATIONED OR TEN PER CENT IN TOTAL INDIGENOUS MANPOWER.

PHASING

13. PHASING IS INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT MBFR IS NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED IN A CONTROLLED AND CALCULABLE PROCESS WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND ACCEPTABLE RESULTS.

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OTHER MBFR MEASURES (CONSTRAINTS, VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION)

14. CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE PART OF THE MBFR PROCESS. ANY REDUCTIONS MUST BE COMPLEMENTED BY APPROPRIATE CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE SHOULD INCLUDE APPROPRIATE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS BUT AGREEMENT ON PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS SHOULD NOT BE A CONDITION TO THE NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS(1). THE

(1) THE SECOND PART OF THIS SENTENCE WAS ACCEPTED AD
REFERENDUM

IMPLEMENTATION OF CONSTRAINTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AT THE LATEST
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE FIRST WITHDRAWALS. NO WITHDRAWALS OR

REDUCTIONS WOULD THEREFORE TAKE PLACE UNTIL SOME AGREEMENT ON CONSTRAINTS AND VERIFICATION HAD BEEN REACHED. (THE GEOGRAPHICAL APPLICATION OF CONSTRAINTS MIGHT NOT BE THE SAME AS THAT OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS.)(1)

(1) THE TEXT IN BRACKETS CAN BE DELETED IF THE FIRST OPTION IN PARAGRAPH 4 IS ADOPTED.

15. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS AND TO SEEK EARLY AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SUCH PROVISIONS(2).

(2) THE LAST THREE SENTENCES OF THIS PARAGRAPH WERE ACCEPTED AD REFERENDUM

16. AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF THE ALLIED APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE TO ENSURE, THROUGH APPROPRIATE MEASURES, THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED, FOR EXAMPLE BY MEANS OF AN INCREASE OF THE LEVEL OF STATIONED SECRET

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FORCES AND THEIR EQUIPMENT IN HUNGARY.

EITHER: (THE QUESTION OF HUNGARY'S INCLUSION IN A CONSTRAINTS AREA SHOULD BE KEPT OPEN.) OR (THE ALLIED CONCEPT SHOULD AT A MINIMUM INCLUDE HUNGARY IN CONSTRAINTS AGREEMENTS.) WAYS MUST BE FOUND TO DEAL WITH THESE VALID MILITARY CONCERNS.

17. WHILE DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS ABOVE, THE ALLIES SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTEREST OF THE FLANK COUNTRIES AND THE INDIVISIBILITY OF THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE. A DECISION OF ANY ALLIED FLANK COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN RESTRICTIONS WHICH WOULD BE PART OF AN AGREEMENT ON FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD BE SUPPORTED BY THE ALLIES.

FORCE IMPROVEMENTS

18. THE ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN AND IMPROVE THEIR FORCES AND TO TAKE STEPS TO ENHANCE ALLIANCE DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES DURING THE MBFR PROCESS. THE APPROPRIATE BODIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE SHOULD EXAMINE ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A PROGRAMME OF IMPROVEMENTS WHICH, IN CONJUNCTION WITH AD 70,

COULD COMPLEMENT THE NEGOTIATING EFFORTS. THE ALLIES ARE ALSO CONVINCED THAT THE SUCCESS OF MBFR WOULD BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED BY UNILATERAL ALLIED REDUCTIONS OR WITHDRAWALS IMPLEMENTED OUTSIDE ITS FRAMEWORK.

II. THE ALLIED POSITION

INTRODUCTION

19. THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS DEFINES THE GOALS THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO SEEK IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. ADJUSTMENT TO THIS POSITION, FOR INSTANCE IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, WOULD NECESSITATE A COLLECTIVE POLICY DECISION TO BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO PROCEDURES AS SET OUT IN SECTION V OF THIS DOCUMENT.

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20. WHEN NECESSARY FOR INTERNAL ALLIANCE PURPOSES OR IN FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE, FOR INSTANCE, DISTINCTIONS AMONG NATO FORCES(1) AND WARSAW PACT FORCES WILL

(1) AT AN APPROPRIATE POINT IN THE FINAL VERSION OF THIS DOCUMENT, IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ANY MEASURES TAKEN PRIOR TO, CONCURRENTLY WITH, OR SUBSEQUENT TO THE REDUCTIONS, OR ANY REDUCTIONS PROPER WHICH ARE AGED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON FORCE REDUCTIONS, APPLY TO THE FRENCH FORCES STILL STATIONED IN THE FRG IN PURSUANCE OF THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS OF 1966 BETWEEN THE BONN AND PARIS GOVERNMENTS. THESE FORCES HAVE NONETHELESS BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR INTERNAL CALCULATIONS OF ALLIED GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA

BE MADE IN TERMS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND, AND "OTHER NATO FORCES" AND "OTHER WARSAW PACT FORCES" ON THE OTHER HAND, RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES.

21. THE TERMS "PHASE", "STAGE" AND "STEP" AS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT DENOTE:

- PHASE: A MAJOR NEGOTIATING PERIOD RESULTING IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT (E.G. THE FIRST PHASE WITH REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US FORCES);
- STAGE: A BLOC OF NEGOTIATING TIME OF UNDETERMINED LENGTH (E.G. THE INITIAL STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS);
- STEP: A NEGOTIATING MOVE (E.G. THE PRESENTATION OF OPENING STATEMENTS IN THE INITIAL STAGE).

PRINCIPLES

22. AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE, A BALANCED OUTCOME THAT WILL ENSURE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE IS A PRINCIPAL ALLIED OBJECTIVE. THIS OBJECTIVE, WHICH IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT ALLIED SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE, SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE AT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. ALLIED PROPOSALS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS OBJECTIVE AND SHOULD GIVE FULL WEIGHT IN EACH PROVISION TO THE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF THE NATO FLANK COUNTRIES.

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PREREDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES

23. PREREDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES APPLICABLE IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA AIM AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE BY REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITY. SUCH CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE MEANS FOR INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. THESE CONSTRAINTS WOULD OF NECESSITY BE APPLIED TO SPECIFIC FORCES IN RELATION TO SPECIFIC TERRITORIES; THEIR FORMULATION SHOULD,

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(I) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA INCLUDING ROTATIONS;

((II) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA;

(III) LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA;

(IV) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES
IN THE AREA.)

REDUCTIONS

24. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORM OF A
COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO
GUIDELINES AREA REACHED IN TWO PHASES THROUGH A MAXIMUM 10 PER
CENT REDUCTION IN OVERALL NATO GROUND FORCES MANPOWER AND WARSAW
PACT REDUCTIONS TO THE RESULTING NATO FORCE LEVEL. THE COMMON
CEILING IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND
(MANPOWER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITY IN TERMS
OF MANPOWER, HEAVY WEAPONRY (TANKS) AND DEPLOYMENT.)

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25. WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS OF SOME US AND SOVIET
GROUND FORCES FROM THE GUIDELINES AREA WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP
TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVE DEFINED ABOVE, I.E. TOWARD AN OVERALL
NATO/WP GROUND (MANPOWER)(FORCE) COMMON CEILING (AT APPROXIMATELY
700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE). THE QUESTION OF HOW SPECIFIC THE
ALLIES WILL BE IN ILLUSTRATING THE COMMON CEILING IN THE INITIAL
STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS DISCUSSED IN SECTION III, BELOW.

26. REDUCTIONS OF ALLIED COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE KEPT TO
THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE WHILE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN
WARSAW PACT COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE SECURED.

(27. IN THE FIRST PHASE THE SOVIETS SHOULD WITHDRAW A TANK
ARMY (5 DIVISIONS AND RELATED ELEMENTS INCLUDING EQUIPMENT) AND
THE US WOULD WITHDRAW AN EQUAL PROPORTION OF THE MANPOWER OF ITS
STATIONED FORCES IN THE AREA(1). THIS WOULD MEAN

(1) (THE PRINCIPLE IN PARAGRAPH 26 MEANS THAT US WITHDRAWALS
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A COMBAT CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT OF TWO
BRIGADES)

REDUCTIONS OF 15 PERCENT ON BOTH SIDES, OR ABOUT 68,000 SOVIET
SOLDIERS PLUS 1,700 TANKS AND ABOUT 29,000 US SOLDIERS.)(TU)

28. THIS REDUCTION CONCEPT HAS THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL
FEATURES:

(I) NATO SHOULD BE PERMITTED FLEXIBILITY IN THE FORM OF
REDUCTION ON GROUNDS OF ASYMMETRY OF CONDITIONS, WHEREAS REDUCTION
OF WARSAW PACT FORCES BY MAJOR UNITS WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT SHOULD
BE SOUGHT;

(II) PROVISIONS CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT ON BOTH
SIDES WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ASYMMETRIES WHICH PERMIT THE
SOVIETS TO REINFORCE MORE RAPIDLY IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN THE
US. IN THIS SENSE, PROVISIONS SHOULD BE SOUGHT PERMITTING THE
US TO STORE AND MAINTAIN US HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE
IN ORDER TO OFFSET THE FACILITY WITH WHICH THE SOVIET FORCES

WITHDRAWN TO THE WESTERN PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS;

((III) SOVIET WITHDRAWALS SHOULD INVOLVE DISBANDMENT WITHOUT REPLACEMENT FROM THE SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE.)

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STABILIZING MEASURES, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS, TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS

29. SUBJECT TO FURTHER EXAMINATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING MEASURES(1)

(1) THESE MEASURES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM THE PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES IN PARAGRAPH 23 ABOVE. EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE MEASURES IN PARAGRAPH 23 WOULD BE SOUGHT IN PARALLEL WITH A NEGOTIATION OF REDUCTIONS IF THE EAST HAS NOT AGREED TO THEM PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS.

APPLICABLE TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA:

(I) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES INTO THE AREA;

EITHER

((II) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA. (PROPOSALS BY THE EAST FOR APPLICATION OF THESE CONSTRAINTS TO OTHER NATO FORCES OR FOR FORMULATIONS WHICH WOULD IMPLY AUTOMATIC APPLICATION OF SUCH CONSTRAINTS IN SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED));

OR

((II) NOTIFICATION, WITHOUT TIME-LAG, OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF FORCES WITHIN THE AREA);

((III) AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED BY A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT. THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE MEANS FOR INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

(30. IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TO ELIMINATE OR MITIGATE ANY INCREASE IN THE THREAT TO THE FLANKS AS A RESULT OF MBFR IN THE CENTRAL REGION, CERTAIN PROVISIONS DESIGNED FOR POSSIBLE USE WITH THE OTHER SIDE IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL NEGOTIATING SITUATION, SHOULD BE URGENTLY STUDIED AND AGREED UPON WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, SUCH AS:

(I) PROVISIONS FOR THE DISBANDMENT OF SOVIET WITHDRAWN

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FORCES WITHOUT REPLACEMENT FROM THE SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE;

(II) PROVISIONS TO PUT IN RESERVE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES;

(III) PROVISIONS TO PREVENT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE THREE WESTERN OR THE LENINGRAD AND ODESSA (OR NORTHERN AND TRANS-CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS);

(IV) OTHER STABILIZING MEASURES, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS).

31. AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF THE ALLIED APPROACH SHOULD BE TO ENSURE THAT ANY AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED OR UNDERMINED, FOR EXAMPLE BY MEANS OF AN INCREASE OF THE SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY. WHILE ALL POSSIBILITIES SHOULD BE STUDIED, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT NON-CIRCUMVENTION WITH RESPECT TO HUNGARY COULD BE ASSURED THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF STABILIZING MEASURES SUCH AS THOSE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 29 ABOVE, THE BEST TIME TO DETERMINE WHICH SPECIFIC MEASURES WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE WILL BE AFTER THE OUTLINE OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT HAS TAKEN SHAPE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLIED PROPOSALS REGARDING HUNGARY CAN BE TAILORED ACCORDINGLY, AND CAN ALSO BE ADVANCED WITH MINIMUM RISK OF EASTERN COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO EXPAND THE GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND CENTRAL EUROPE. REFERENCE IS MADE IN THIS CONTEXT TO PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE. IN A NON-CIRCUMVENTION AGREEMENT CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO AVOID AN INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIED NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE SO WORDED THAT IT COULD BE INTERPRETED BY THE WARSAW PACT AS IMPLYING A GENERAL INHIBITION OF ANY REINFORCEMENT OR REDEPLOYMENT OF CONCERNED NATO FORCES ANYWHERE IN ACE OUTSIDE THE GUIDELINES AREA. SUCH INHIBITION COULD AMOUNT TO A DE FACTO FREEZE OF THOSE FORCES WITHIN THE ENTIRE ACE AREA.

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VERIFICATION

32. THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

33.

(A) NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS.

(B) IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES (1) (I.E. TO ADVERSARY ON-SITE

(1) FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS IS REQUIRED

INSPECTION) APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA,
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SUCH AS:

(I) REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF GEOGRAPHIC AND OTHER EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON GROUND OBSERVATION;

(II) OBSERVATION OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS BY GROUND OBSERVERS;

(III) SPECIAL MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN THE POST-MBFR PERIOD;

(IV) LIGHT AIR CAPABILITY (HELICOPTERS) FOR MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS.

(PARTICIPATION OF LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE HOST COUNTRY IN ANY INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD BE ASSURED.)

((C) THE TERRITORIAL RESTRICTION MADE ABOVE FOR OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES, I.E. THAT THEY ARE APPLICABLE TO THE GUIDELINES AREA, DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF LESS INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES DESIGNED TO ACCOMPANY STABILIZING MEASURES OF THE KIND SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 30 ABOVE.)

PROVISIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND PHASE

EITHER

(34. THE ALLIES WILL SEEK INCLUSION IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT OF LANGUAGE PROVIDING FOR A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED IN THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE THE AGGREGATES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE GUIDELINES AREA AFTER A FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE.)

PLUS
EITHER

(IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO TRY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO
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DEFINE FURTHER THE CONTENT OF A LATER PHASE BEFORE THE OUTCOME OF THE FIRST PHASE CAN REALISTICALLY BE PROJECTED AND THE ALLIES

SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT NAARITION AT THIS TIME. SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED IN PARALLEL WITH NEGOTIATION ON THE REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPHS 24-28 ABOVE. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING THIS TOPIC WITH THE EAST EARLY IN NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT THE SECOND PHASE WOULD COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL MBFR GOAL OF A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE GUIDELINES AREA.)

OR

(THIS SECOND PHASE, WHICH IN DUE COURSE SHOULD BE FURTHER EXAMINED AND REFLECTED UPON WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WILL, ON THE WESTERN SIDE AT LEAST, FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF NATO FORCES HERE THAN US FORCES. EACH ALLIANCE WOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT OF THE REDUCTIONS OF NON-US AND NON-SOVIET FORCES REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED. REDUCED FORCES OF COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA SHOULD BE INACTIVATED AND PUT IN RESERVE STATUS. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE THE OVERALL "COMMON CEILINGS" WOULD BE RESPECTED BY EACH SIDE, WITH NO SUB-CEILINGS OTHER THAN THOSE RESPECTIVELY AFFECTING THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING.)

OR

(35. THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS AS WELL AS THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN A PRECISE AND COMMITTING MANNER DURING NEGOTIATION OF THE FIRST PHASE. THIS CAN BE DONE IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

(I) AN INITIAL AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES MUST BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE

OF NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF NATO AND WP
GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA IN ORDER TO COMPLETE
MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL MBFR GOAL OF A COMMON
CEILING AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 24 ABOVE;
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(II) DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE
NATO ALLIES WILL NEGOTIATE FOR AGREEMENT TO OUR
CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR NATO AND WP
GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE; AND TO THE
CONTINUATION OF MBFR IN A SECOND PHASE;

(III) THE DETAILED NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR THE SECOND
PHASE, INCLUDING THE SPECIFICATION OF THE COMMON
CEILING (LEVELS AND COMPOSITION) WILL BE DETERMINED
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIANCE WOULD WISH
TO BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT
OF THE REDUCTION REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE
SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES
INVOLVED./(GE)

(36. IN SUMMARY, IN THE FIRST PHASE OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,
THE ALLIES WILL SEEK SOVIET COMMITMENT TO (THE REDUCTION OF A
SOVIET TANK ARMY,) A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE COMMON
CEILING CONCEPT. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT INVOLVING ONLY US
AND SOVIET REDUCTION SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A SECOND PHASE. THE
ALLIES SHOULD ILLUSTRATE THEIR COMMON CEILING CONCEPT TO THE
SOVIETS BY SAYING IT WOULD BE ABOUT 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE
AND TEST SOVIET REACTION TO THIS OVERALL FIGURE, BUT THEY
SHOULD NOT INSIST ON SOVIET AGREEMENT TO THIS SPECIFIC FIGURE
AS A PREREQUISITE TO NEGOTIATING THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.)

PROVISIONS FOR REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF, OR WITHDRAWAL FROM, A
POSSIBLE PHASE I AGREEMENT

37. (LANGUAGE TO BE PROVIDED LATER.)

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

38. THIS SECTION CONTAINS ALLIED THINKING ON THE STRATEGY
OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS, (SAY, THE FIRST TWO TO FOUR MONTHS) (I.E. DURING
THE FIRST FEW MONTHS, DEPENDING UPON THE POLITICAL AND NEGOTIA-
TING SITUATION). IN PARTICULAR IT DISCUSSES THE MAJOR STEPS IN
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PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED POSITION TO THE EAST, AS WELL AS THE
QUESTIONS OF WHEN AND HOW THOSE STEPS WOULD BE TAKEN.

39. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME TO FORESEE THE ENTIRE COURSE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS OR TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR THE WHOLE NEGOTIATION. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SCARCITY OF AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS PRECLUDE THIS.

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40. AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL, IN FACT, BE UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE EAST'S ATTITUDES AND INTENTIONS. DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST WILL ADD TO ALLIED KNOWLEDGE OF THE WARSAW PACT'S OBJECTIVES, WILL REVEAL SOME OF ITS STRATEGY FOR MORE THAN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, THINKING ON STRATEGY MUST IN THE NATURE OF THINGS REMAIN OPEN.

41. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE ALLIES ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A NEGOTIATING STRATEGY WHICH REQUIRES FREQUENT SHIFTS IN THEIR BASIC POSITION. WHILE IT MIGHT BE THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO BUILD A SERIES OF POSITIONS AND FALLBACKS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE TRADING ROOM, SUCH AN APPROACH WILL NOT BE FEASIBLE FOR A LARGE, COMPLEX MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION LIKE MBFR. ALLIED UNITY, WHICH WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR COMMON PURPOSES IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WILL REQUIRE CO-ORDINATION OF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS, AND SUCH CO-ORDINATION NECESSARILY TAKES TIME. WESTERN COUNTRIES WILL FIND IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITION TO PARLIAMENTS, AND IN LESSER DETAIL TO PUBLIC OPINION. AN INITIAL
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POSITION WITH SUBSTANTIAL ADDITIONAL DEMANDS ON THE OTHER SIDE WOULD NOT BE PLAUSIBLE, AND FREQUENT SHIFTS TO FALLBACK POSITIONS WOULD BE CONFUSING AND UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE. MOREOVER, IF THE WEST WERE TO ATTEMPT TO BARGAIN FROM DELIBERATELY INFLATED POSITIONS, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO KEEP THE ALLIED STRATEGY AND ITS FALLBACKS FROM BECOMING KNOWN TO THE EAST. AT THE END OF SUCH A PROCESS, THE WEST WOULD STILL HAVE TO FACE THE PROBLEM OF PERSUADING THE EAST THAT ITS BASIC POSITION WAS IN FACT SERIOUSLY INTENDED.

42. TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE MOST EFFECTIVE GENERAL APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO TAKE A FIRM BASIC POSITION AND TO STICK TO IT AS THE WESTERN SIDE ATTEMPTS TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATION THROUGH DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GENERALIZATION DOWN TO THE SPECIFICS OF ACTUAL AGREEMENT. IT WILL BE A CARDINAL POINT OF NEGOTIATING STRATEGY FOR THE ALLIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR AGREED POSITION WITH MAXIMUM CONSISTENCY, DETERMINATION AND PERSEVERANCE.

43. THE INITIAL STAGE WOULD INCLUDE THE PRESENTATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL VIEWPOINTS ON BOTH SIDES, EXPLORATION OF ATTITUDES, AND THE PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL AND OF PREREDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES. THE ALLIANCE SHOULD RETAIN FLEXIBILITY ON THE TEMPO OF THESE PRESENTATIONS DEPENDING UPON WHAT THE EAST MIGHT PUT FORWARD. SINCE WESTERN COUNTRIES ARE THE INVITING PARTY, BOTH THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD EXPECT THE ALLIES TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN ADVANCING SUGGESTIONS, AND IT WOULD BE IN THE WESTERN INTEREST TO DO SO. THE INITIAL STAGE WOULD CULMINATE WITH AN EFFORT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A NEGOTIATION LEADING TO PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS.

STEPS IN INITIAL STAGE

44. THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING MAJOR STEPS:

45. OPENING STATEMENTS. OPENING STATEMENTS IN PLENARY SESSION WOULD BE OF A GENERAL, PROGRAMMATIC CHARACTER. THEY WOULD BE BASED UPON AGREED ALLIANCE POLICY WITH THE DETAILS CO-ORDINATED IN THE AD HOC GROUP IN MEETINGS STARTING IN BRUSSELS

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PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON 30TH OCTOBER.

46. THEMATIC MATERIAL FOR THE OPENING STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUCH THAT IT WILL:

-BE SUPPORTED BY ALL ALLIED PARTICIPANTS;

- DRIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARD OUTCOMES PREFERRED BY THE ALLIES;

-BE CREDIBLE AND DEFENDABLE VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SIDE;

- BE REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE EYES OF WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION;

- LEAVE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AND REFINEMENTS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS.

47. DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES. AFTER THE FIRST ROUND OF OPENING STATEMENTS, FURTHER PLENARY SESSIONS WOULD BE DEVOTED TO PRESENTATIONS DEVELOPING THE MAIN THEMES OF THE WESTERN STATEMENTS, INCLUDING SUCH MATTERS AS ASYMMETRIES IN THE MILITARY SITUATIONS OF EAST AND WEST, THREATENING ELEMENTS, THE NEED FOR PARITY AND A COMMON CEILING. THIS DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES WILL DESCRIBE THE OVERALL PROBLEM AS THE ALLIES SEE IT AND WILL DEFINE AND EMPHASISE THE GENERAL CONCEPTS ON WHICH THE ALLIES WILL RELY IN THE FURTHER STAGES OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL SET FORTH THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT IN WHICH SPECIFIC ALLIED PROPOSALS WILL LATER BE DEVELOPED.

48. THE EAST FOR ITS PART WILL PROBABLY ALSO FOLLOW UP ITS OPENING STATEMENTS WITH FURTHER ELABORATION. THIS EXCHANGE OF AMPLIFYING STATEMENTS WILL PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A GENERAL EXPLORATION OF EACH SIDE'S VIEWPOINT.

49. FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO TIE TOGETHER THE STRANDS DEVELOPED IN THE EXPOSITION OF MAJOR THEMES BY THE INITIAL PRESENTATION OF AN ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. IT WOULD INCLUDE THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ALONG THE LINES DESCRIBED IN SECTION II OF THIS PAPER.

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50. AT THIS POINT, THE WESTERN PRESENTATION WOULD STILL BE IN GENERAL TERMS AND WE WOULD NOT EXPECT THE EAST TO REACT TO IT IN A DEVINITIVE MANNER. PRECISELY HOW SPECIFIC THE ALLIES WILL BE IN ILLUSTRATING THIS INITIAL PRESENTATION OF THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL WITH ACTUAL NUMBERS DRAWN FROM THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN SECTION II WILL DEPEND UPON THE TACTICAL SITUATION WHICH OBTAINS AT THAT TIME. AT THIS POINT, THE ALLIES BELIEVE THAT THIS PRESENTATION SHOULD NOT GO ANY FURTHER INTO DETAIL ON THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THEIR POSITION THEN IS REQUIRED TO INDICATE THE PARAMETERS OF THEIR POSITION, (E.G., THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE, THE FIGURE OF ABOUT 700,000 MEN FOR THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE, (THE TANK ARMY) AND THE 15 PERCENT FIGURES FOR THE FIRST PHASE.) OR (BY PUTTING FORWARD THE CONCEPT OF AN ENENTUAL COMMON CEILING BUT WITHOUT SPECIFYING EXACTLY WHAT THE LEVEL OF THIS COMMON CEILING WOULD BE. (IN ADVANCING THE

IDEA OF AN EVENTUAL COMMON CEILING, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE CALCULATED ON A BASIS OF MANPOWER ALONE BUT THAT OTHER ELEMENTS, E.G. TANKS, NEED TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.) IN ADDITION TO THE NOTION OF AN EVENTUAL COMMON CEILING, WESTERN NEGOTIATORS WOULD INCLUDE IN THEIR INITIAL FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL THE PARAMETERS OF THE FIRST PHASE, I.E. (THE SOVIET TANK ARMY AND) THE 15 PERCENT US REDUCTIONS. BUT A FINAL DECISION ON WHICH FIGURES SHOULD BE TABLED AT PARTICULAR POINTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NEED NOT BE TAKEN NOW.)

51. PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD THEN MOVE TO MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL. THE FIRST TOPIC TO BE TREATED IN MORE DETAIL THEN HAD BEEN DONE BEFORE WOULD BE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. THE ALLIES WOULD ENGAGE IN A VIGOROUS EFFORT TO PROBE SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THE TOPIC AND TO GET THE SOVIETS INTO NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. IT WILL BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO HAVE FIRST SKETCHED OUT THE GENERAL CONTEXT OF THE ALLIES' OVERALL POSITION IN WHICH THE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD FIND THEIR PLACE; THE ALLIES WOULD THUS HAVE ANTICIPATED PROBABLE SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO ADDRESS CONSTRAINTS WITHOUT REGARD TO REDUCTIONS. DEPENDING ON HOW THE EAST REACTS, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE AN ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO REACH EARLY AGREEMENT ON PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS. IF SUCH AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, THE ALLIES WILL MAKE A FURTHER DETERMINATION OF WHAT DEGREE OF
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FORMALITY MAY BE POSSIBLE FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

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52. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS TOPIC WOULD CONCLUDE THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THE ALLIES CONCEIVE IT. THE NEXT STEP OF THE NEGOTIATION WOULD BE A DETAILED AND INTENSIVE PRESENTATION OF ALLIED PROPOSALS FOR THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING CONCERTED JUSTIFICATION AND ADVOCACY OF THE WHOLE REDUCTION PROGRAMME (LEADING TO THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE) OR (SEEKING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING OBJECTIVE).

53. PROCEDURES AND AGENDA. THE ALLIES WOULD NOT SEEK TO MAKE A SEPARATE STATE OR STEP OF A DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES OR AGENDA, LEST SOME OF THE SATISFACTORY RESULTS OF THE VIENNA PREPARATORY TALKS BE PUT AT HAZARD.

54. IN PARTICULAR, THE ALLIES WOULD RESIST ANY EASTERN ATTEMPT TO INVITE OTHER COUNTRIES TO JOIN THE TALKS OR TO RENEW THEIR PROPOSAL TO USE A SINGLE WORKING GROUP AS A VEHICLE FOR NARROWING THE EXISTING SCOPE OF ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY TO THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

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55. REGARDLESS OF THE SEQUENCE OF MAIN TOPICS DECIDED ON BY THE ALLIES FOR THE INITIAL STAGE, IT WOULD APPEAR FRUITLESS TO SEEK TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT ON AN AGENDA INCORPORATING THIS SEQUENCE. CERTAIN POINTS, SUCH AS THE MODALITIES OF THE PRESENTATION OF OPENING STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES AND A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT OF MAIN THEMES FROM THESE STATEMENTS, WOULD NOT BE CONTROVERSIAL AND COULD BE SETTLED INFORMALLY PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON 30TH OCTOBER. BUT EFFORTS TO GAIN SOVIET CONCURRENCE TO INCLUDE, IN AN AGREED AGENDA, TOPICS SUCH AS THE ALLIED FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL OR INDIVIDUAL ITEMS LIKE THE COMMON CEILING OR PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS WOULD BE UNPRODUCTIVE. MOREOVER, SUCH EFFORTS ARE UNNECESSARY. IT WAS AGREED IN THE VIENNA TALKS THAT EITHER SIDE COULD RAISE MATTERS OF INTEREST TO IT WITHOUT PROCEDURAL OBJECTION BEING RAISED. THE ALLIES THEREFORE MAY PRESENT ANY GIVEN SUBJECT INCLUDING THEIR FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL AS ONE THEY INTEND TO DISCUSS AND NEGOTIATE ON. THE WARSAW PACT CAN DO THE SAME. THERE PROBABLY WILL BE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE EAST AS TO THE SEQUENCE IN WHICH TOPICS TABLED BY BOTH SIDES WILL BE HANDLED. THIS MIGHT BE RESOLVED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH USE OF THE CONCEPT THAT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT TO PERMIT EACH SIDE TO DEVELOP POINTS OF GREATEST INTEREST TO IT IN PARALLEL. THE WEST COULD THEN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE EAST TO PARTICIPATE IN DETAILED DISCUSSION OF PREREDUCTION CONSTRAINTS IN RETURN FOR ALLIED AGREEMENT TO DEAL WITH REDUCTIONS NEXT.

IV. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES

V. INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION

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